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[GH-ISSUE #2080] It is not possible to find out the user who installed a certain software using the action_type chocoinstall #3238
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starred/tacticalrmm#3238
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Originally created by @eduardoglazar on GitHub (Nov 25, 2024).
Original GitHub issue: https://github.com/amidaware/tacticalrmm/issues/2080
Server Info (please complete the following information):
Installation Method:
--insecureflag at installAgent Info (please complete the following information):
Describe the bug
Any software installed through the Web GUI on a workstation, in the path Software -> Install Software, does not register the user who did it, generating a security breach.
We searched the tacticalrmm database table and in the logs_pendingaction table there is no link to the user who performed the activity.
This record is not available anywhere, so it is impossible to find out who installed a certain software through Tactical RMM using the action_type chocoinstall.
To Reproduce
Steps to reproduce the behavior:
Expected behavior
It was hoped that somewhere in Tactical there would be such a record.
@P6g9YHK6 commented on GitHub (Nov 25, 2024):
at this point it's not a security flaw it's a security lifestyle choice!
https://github.com/amidaware/tacticalrmm/issues/1773
https://github.com/amidaware/tacticalrmm/issues/2060
https://github.com/amidaware/tacticalrmm/issues/1711
https://github.com/amidaware/tacticalrmm/issues/1554
https://github.com/amidaware/tacticalrmm/issues/1417
https://github.com/amidaware/tacticalrmm/issues/1353
https://github.com/amidaware/tacticalrmm/issues/1539
https://github.com/amidaware/tacticalrmm/issues/1937
😘
@eduardoglazar commented on GitHub (Nov 25, 2024):
@P6g9YHK6, In fact, it is not a vulnerability, but rather a suggested security improvement.
If it were possible to include the user ID (accounts_user) in the logs_pendingaction table that performed the action, it would already be useful, since we can obtain the data directly from the PostgreSQL database.
@P6g9YHK6 commented on GitHub (Nov 25, 2024):
i was just joking that a lot of thing are missing audits in the application as a whole
from my point of view if something can be clicked/edited there should be an audit log that is from agent action or trmm settings itself
@wh1te909 commented on GitHub (Nov 26, 2024):
dupe #1353