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[GH-ISSUE #945] Unable to disable the password hint #671
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Originally created by @eana on GitHub (Apr 2, 2020).
Original GitHub issue: https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/issues/945
Subject of the issue
Unable to disable the password hint.
Your environment
"show_password_hint": falseinconfig.jsonfileSteps to reproduce
docker-compose.ymlfileconfig.jsonfile and set"show_password_hint": falsedocker-compose -f docker-compose.yml up -dExpected behaviour
Using the "Get master password hint" feature should be disabled.
Actual behaviour
Using the "Get master password hint" sends an email with the password hint.
Relevant logs
@BlackDex commented on GitHub (Apr 2, 2020):
Hmmm, this is a bit wierd indeed.
That setting will only work if you have e-mail disabled.
I Think we need to add an extra option in this case.
This would disable password hint entirely.
This would allow e-mailing the password hints when e-mail is verified.
This would show the password hint in the error message on the top right.
And it should maybe also only sent out an e-mail when the e-mail address is verified maybe.
@dani-garcia What do you think?
@dani-garcia commented on GitHub (Apr 2, 2020):
The setting was only meant to not display the password hint to everyone who requested it, because there's no other way to show it with email disabled, but at the same time it's not very secure to just show it like that.
I'm not sure what's the point of disabling it when the email is configured correctly? I'd rather not add extra options that don't have a useful purpose, we already have a lot of them as it is.
@BlackDex commented on GitHub (Apr 2, 2020):
Ah indeed. I do agree with that.
If we would add that it will also differ a bit to much from upstream.
Then @eana, i would suggest to modify the e-mail templates if really do not want this to be sent out.
You can probably copy the "pw_hint_none.*" files over the "pw_hint_some.*" files and you are done.
@eana commented on GitHub (Apr 2, 2020):
@dani-garcia @BlackDex I am evaluating bitwarden now, so I don't know it inside out yet, so, please bear with me here for a bit. Copying the
pw_hint_none.*files over thepw_hint_some.*files will still send the email, right?I see a use case where you want to keep the email configured but have the password hint disabled as in no emails sent.
I want my bitwarden instance to be publicly available and to get email notifications when a new login is performed (maybe use email verification as a two-step login along with authy... I don't know, I haven't decided yet). But I don't want to put my email server at risk by having the password hint enabled.
Of course, I can have fail2ban in front of bitwarden to prevent this kind of abuse, but I still think it would be really nice to be able to to disable the password hint while having the email configured.
@BlackDex commented on GitHub (Apr 3, 2020):
Why would having password hints sent by e-mail be a security risk for your e-mail server?
It would be the same risk as having authentication e-mails sent out.
Fail2Ban is good for stopping brute force login attempts.
I would always enable that for any environment where i need to have logins or chances of people trying to hack or whatever.
@eana commented on GitHub (Apr 3, 2020):
I think my example was poorly worded, not clear and generated some confusion, I am sorry. I will try to explain the use case again.
One way to hurt you would be to flood your email servers with password emails. If bitwarden is publicly available anyone can actually abuse the password hint functionality. I can have a bot to send hint emails every second or whatever. The risk for my email server is to have the emails piling up in the queue, which means disk IO, CPU and memory load. So, not a risk in the sense of getting hacked per se, but more in the sense of possibly getting the server unnecessarily loaded and flooding the destination mailbox.
(Of course, fail2ban is gonna be deployed regardless)
@BlackDex commented on GitHub (Apr 3, 2020):
I can do the same by just spamming your e-mail server it self from the outside.
Or by just requesting multiple pages on the public available bitwarden (or any other service i can find on the same IP).
These items i think belong more to the security/firewalling in front of any application accessible from the public internet.
Most reverse proxies have some form of rate limiting to prevent or lower attacks like this.
You can also choose to install a separate postfix which does some outgoing rate limiting which then forwards it to the main mail server.
Trying to built-in items like this is i think a bit out of scope for this project. And where other tools are better designed for and is there main goal, like nginx or haproxy etc..
@eana commented on GitHub (Apr 16, 2020):
It is not really the same thing, but I can understand the diverging too much from the upstream argument.