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[PR #3130] [MERGED] Ignore RRSIGs that claim NSEC/NSEC3 wildcards #3581
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starred/hickory-dns#3581
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📋 Pull Request Information
Original PR: https://github.com/hickory-dns/hickory-dns/pull/3130
Author: @divergentdave
Created: 7/17/2025
Status: ✅ Merged
Merged: 7/21/2025
Merged by: @djc
Base:
main← Head:david/ignore-nsec-nsec3-wildcard-expansion📝 Commits (1)
69b2ecfIgnore RRSIGs that claim NSEC/NSEC3 wildcards📊 Changes
1 file changed (+10 additions, -0 deletions)
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📝
crates/proto/src/dnssec/dnssec_dns_handle/mod.rs(+10 -0)📄 Description
This adds a check for RRSIG records that cover NSEC or NSEC3 RRsets with a wildcard name that has been expanded. In order to address #2882, RRset validation will need to become re-entrant, since validating a wildcard expanded RRset requires validating one or more NSEC or NSEC3 RRsets. This PR gets out ahead of a possible infinite loop that could be triggered by a malicious server. Names of NSEC and NSEC3 records are spelled out in their respective RFCs, and neither can contain a wildcard label, so I think it should be fine to just ignore the relevant RRSIG, and treat the record as bogus.
Edit: NSEC records can have asterisk labels in their names, but importantly their names do not get expanded when they are sent by name servers.
🔄 This issue represents a GitHub Pull Request. It cannot be merged through Gitea due to API limitations.