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[PR #2756] [MERGED] proto: add algorithm identifier to TrustAnchor #3290
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📋 Pull Request Information
Original PR: https://github.com/hickory-dns/hickory-dns/pull/2756
Author: @divergentdave
Created: 2/7/2025
Status: ✅ Merged
Merged: 2/8/2025
Merged by: @divergentdave
Base:
main← Head:david/trust-anchor-check-algorithm📝 Commits (1)
9fed3fcproto: add algorithm identifier to TrustAnchor📊 Changes
3 files changed (+22 additions, -10 deletions)
View changed files
📝
crates/proto/src/dnssec/dnssec_dns_handle/mod.rs(+1 -1)📝
crates/proto/src/dnssec/public_key.rs(+1 -0)📝
crates/proto/src/dnssec/trust_anchor.rs(+20 -9)📄 Description
This changes the API of the
TrustAnchorto take an algorithm as well, and compares both the encoded public key and algorithm identifier when testing membership. This prevents confusion between unrelated algorithms, or hash algorithm downgrades.The trust anchor's current behavior isn't exploitable, because the three ECC algorithms all have different public key sizes, and downgrading from RSASHA256/RSASHA512 to RSASHA1 requires a SHA-1 second preimage attack for a complete break, which is impractical. As new algorithms are added, failing to check the algorithm type could get more dangerous.
🔄 This issue represents a GitHub Pull Request. It cannot be merged through Gitea due to API limitations.