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[GH-ISSUE #250] Disable DNS server after API inactivity #124
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Originally created by @nescafe2002 on GitHub (Dec 7, 2020).
Original GitHub issue: https://github.com/acme-dns/acme-dns/issues/250
Since my IP got hammered a lot with invalid DNS requests:
As ACME DNS is relevant during certificate only, I have configured my router to enable forwarding only on renewals:
(MikroTik rsc)
This works perfectly and the amount of bogus DNS requests to my ip has dropped significantly.
However, this poses a slight problem; if the requesting server has ipv6 access only and LE is using the ipv4 endpoint to verify DNS; i cannot address ipv4 address lists from the ipv6 firewall. Therefore I'd like to drop this here as a feature request:
Is there a way to enable the built in dns server only for a specified time after the /update endpoint has been addressed?
@nescafe2002 commented on GitHub (Dec 15, 2020):
Well, problem is that this (tls host based) port knocking solution blocks acme-dns functionality if the api is exposed through the NS delegated domain as in the default setup.
E.g. api endpoint https://auth.example.org
ACME-dns entry {GUID}.auth.example.org
File config.cfg:
I have removed the configuration from my router and replaced it with a simple "no answer = no response" rule:
github.com/nescafe2002/acme-dns@bfd0389aa7Is there any info on how acme-dns contributes to DNS (amplification) attacks based on bogus (spoofed) requests?